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Jack Moss (Rosey Grier) lies in a hospital bed, sedated and recover­
ing from grueling surgery. His drowsy eyes flutter open and fall upon 
his reflection in the mirror. The black man discovers the head of a white 
man, Dr. Maxwell Kirshner (Ray Milland), attached to his shoulder. His 
terrified hands poke and prod the growth until Kirshner growls, "Take 
your hands off of me !"  Moss demands an explanation, asking the head 
where the rest of its body is before the doctor simply explains, "We are 
joined together temporarily ."  So begins the turning point of Lee Frost' s 
The Thing with Two Heads, the 1 972 blaxploitation horror film featuring 
a monster with two heads : one black, one white. 
The film arrives at this point after Dr. Kirshner, a racist surgeon, 
begins battling terminal cancer. With only a few weeks to live, he de­
vises a plan to transplant his head onto another body, but the only availa­
ble one belongs to Jack Moss, a black convict on death row. After 
doctors successfully graft Kirshner' s head onto Moss, these drastically 
different personalities drag their shared anatomy in opposite directions .  
While in control of the body, Moss escapes from prison and tries to 
prove his innocence. While Dr. Kirshner has control, he tries to turn 
himself into the police and remove Moss ' s  head. This two-headed man 
fuses separate persons but also segregated races in a kind of conjoined 
twin mulatto . 
Despite, or perhaps precisely because of, this campy premise, the 
film offers serious consideration of the relationship between conjoined 
twins and mulattoes. Throughout history, both have been considered 
monstrous .  The former has challenged notions of individuality while the 
latter has challenged ideas about race, and analyzing the similarities be­
tween conjoined twin and mulatto monster discourses can reveal much 
about American assumptions about normative anatomy as well as norma­
tive monoraciality . Despite its flaws, The Thing with Two Heads occu­
pies a special place in American discourse because it articulates the ways 
in which conjoined twins and mulattoes resemble each other as monsters 
that defy notions of personal and racial selfhood in the United States .  
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CONTEXT 
Before exploring how this film fits into the context of tragic mulatto 
discourse, it would be valuable to first explore the history of this trope .  
The tragic mulatto stereotype has largely been a literary one with novels 
written by all kinds of writers-African Americans, whites,  anti-racists, 
and bigots, various thinkers using the multiracial character to either de­
fend or challenge racism. To a certain extent, in American literature and 
scholarship, a type of subgenre has emerged, a sort of tragic mulatto 
literature that, regardless of an author' s  racial identity or political pur­
poses, focuses on black-white biracial protagonists . 
From Charles W. Chesnutt' s The House Behind the Cedars ( 1 900) 
to James Weldon Johnson' s  The Autobiography of an Ex-Colored Man 
( 1 9 1 2) to Nella Larsen' s  Passing ( 1 929), there has emerged a kind of 
canon of tragic mulatto literature, and in scholarly works from Judith 
Berzon' s  Neither White Nor Black to Werner Sollors' Neither Black Nor 
White Yet Both,  certain texts have garnered attention while others fell by 
the wayside . Regarding tragic mulatto literature, the most respected and 
analyzed works have been by African American writers from either the 
Reconstruction Era or the Harlem Renaissance writing for overtly politi­
cal reasons, using the melodramatic plights of biracial characters to con­
demn racism. What has emerged as the informal catalog worth scholarly 
attention is also dominated by relatively realistic story worlds:  political 
subjects in American society grappling with racial constructs and the 
confines of white supremacy. These sentimental works might stretch the 
bounds of plausibility, but they rarely bend the limits of reality itself. 
They may feature exaggerated versions of human characters and sensa­
tional depictions of multiracial life-extraordinary circumstances that do 
not reflect the struggles of real multiracial Americans-but they do not 
venture into the intentionally bizarre. 
With the relative realism of tragic mulatto literature, any horror text 
dealing with multiraciality becomes extraordinary. An essential charac­
teristic of the horror genre that distinguishes it from all others is that it 
takes possibility to fantastic lengths . The rules of physical existence no 
longer apply because the dead can walk, humans become wolves, and 
ghosts haunt houses . Such works seem to employ these supernatural ele­
ments to terrify audiences, using the impossible to horrify viewers and 
readers , but to belong to the horror genre it is not enough for a text to 
merely frighten audiences. Simple sight gags, jumping out of the bushes, 
or a screeching bus can do that. To go beyond temporary fright to para­
lyzing horror, texts must present more than a physical threat ; they must 
present what Noel Carroll calls a "cognitive threat" that compromises 
more than a person' s  sense of physical safety (34) . They must under­
mine a person' s sense of the world, everything she assumes to be true, 
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the very foundation of her individual knowledge as well as her culture ' s  
conceptual foundations.  In this regard, horror, by its very character, must 
stretch reality, must explore the ridiculous to achieve its purposes . To be 
horror, these texts must not represent reality as it i s ;  they must consider 
what it could be. 
Therefore, horror, to a certain extent, does not have to back up its 
underlying premises with realistic credibility . Its fictions are speculative, 
dealing with possibilities rather than plausibilities, and, for this reason, 
they are especially ripe for theoretical examination. Horror scholars 
have continually shown how this "ridiculous" genre exposes society ' s  
deepest anxieties, values ,  and fears more than "serious" genres.  For ex­
ample, Philip Brophy' s  notion of "horrality" noted how these films com­
bined horror and humor as a fruitful site for theoretical exploration 
precisely because they did not attempt to be realistic . Robin Wood has 
argued that horror films expose "the return of the repressed," unveiling 
the horrors a society would like to disavow. Like a patient of psychoa­
nalysis lying on a couch may provide "truer" information by relaying her 
unconscious dreams than by articulating her conscious thoughts, Ameri­
can culture may reveal itself more honestly through incredible genres 
like horror than more serious ones like literature. 
In the case of tragic mulatto fiction, scholars that analyze "serious" 
works could benefit from making room for more ridiculous ones. Be­
yond the pursuits of authors during the Reconstruction Era or the Harlem 
Renaissance, horror films of the 1 970s have the relative luxury of theo­
retical speculation. While writers like Chesnutt, Johnson, and Larsen 
wrote with a greater sense of urgency for audiences that required realistic 
settings ,  characters ,  and plots , the horror directors of the 1 970s wrote 
with a greater sense of speculation for audiences that were willing to 
suspend their disbelief to an unparalleled extent. 
Therefore, horror texts, by the very aspirations of their character, 
enjoy a degree of freedom other kinds do not. Those works that consider 
biracial issues have the opportunity to explore the contradictions of 
American racial discourse in ways other mulatto literature cannot, be­
cause, freed from the confines of political expediency or literary plausi­
bility, the horror genre can investigate the possibilities of race in ways no 
other genre can. At the same time, precisely due to their ridiculousness,  
because of their silly plots and laughable premises, essentially because 
their surrealism often reveals things about reality, these texts may also 
jokingly expose the truest aspects of American racism. 
To see the degree to which humorously absurd horror films may 
reveal seriously penetrating truths about race relations in the United 
States, we need to look no further than The Thing with Two Heads. A 
movie about a black convict and white racist sharing a body certainly fits 
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the bill of a ludicrous text, but to consider the possible significance of 
this film, in addition to understanding its position in tragic mulatto litera­
ture, we must first examine its position in the subgenre of blaxploitation 
horror film. Largely produced between 1 969 and 1 976, blaxploitation 
films targeted African American audiences to an unprecedented extent. 
Notable films include hits such as Sweet Sweetback 's Baadasssss Song 
(Van Peebles 1 97 1 ) , Shaft (Parks 1 97 1 ) , and Superfly (Parks 1 972) . 1 
Most of these movies dealt with urban strife, poverty, and crime, but, in 
1 972,  the genre expanded beyond the confines of gritty realism with Wil­
liam Crain' s  Blacula.  Rather than focus on cops,  drug dealers, and 
pimps,  this film rewrote the Dracula tale by placing an African Ameri­
can vampire (William Marshall) in contemporary Los Angeles .  Follow­
ing Blacula ' s  success,  a string of "African-Americanized" horror films 
were released including Blackenstein (Levey 1 973) ,  Abby (Girdler 1 974) , 
and Dr. Black, Mr. Hyde (Crain 1 976) .  
As part of the exploitation industry, these films were produced 
cheaply and, without the hope of gaining wider viewership, confronted 
unpopular issues .  As part of the blaxploitation industry targeted mostly 
for African American audiences, these films explored racial issues that 
films made for whites often avoided. As horror films, they inserted un­
realistic elements into otherwise realistic narratives ,  exploring black real­
ity in ways other films had not. In "Blaxploitation Horror Films :  Generic 
Reappropriation or Reinscription?" Harry M. Benshoff notes the ways in 
which films from this genre used the monster as "an allegory for the 
historical experience of African Americans" (38) .  Throughout horror 
films, monstrosity often erupts as a result of fusing disparate elements . 
Many Blaxploitation horror films used their monsters as an opportunity 
to "play out interesting variations on W.E.B . DuBois ' s  concept of 
' twoness '  in the African American psyche" (39) .  Blacula, Blackenstein, 
and Dr. Black all suffered the internal conflict of monsters that haunted 
other corners of horror film, but unlike them their struggles were also 
racial ones as they grappled to unite multiple physical forms into a single 
monstrous body but also multiple racial identities into a single racial 
body. In this regard, blaxploitation horror films enjoyed a perfect storm 
of material conditions and genre expectations that permitted them to con­
sider racial issues in ways other texts could not. 
American International Pictures was at the forefront of such films . 
Created in 1 956,  this production company focused on low-budget, inde­
pendent double features for teenagers . Early on, the studio churned out 
drag racing and beach movies, but, by the 60s, launched into acclaim 
1 For an interesting source on the ways in which other Blaxploitation films alluded to 
biracial issues, see Gregory T. Carter' s "From Blaxploitation to Mixploitation: Mixed-Race, 
Male Leads and Changing Black Identities ." 
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with the Roger Corman and Vincent Price remakes of Edgar Allan Poe 
stories .  In the 1 970s, they moved into blaxploitation films like The Mack 
(Campus 1973) ,  Black Caesar (Cohen 1 973) ,  and Foxy Brown (Hill 
1 974) . In 1 972, they combined their two most lucrative genres of horror 
and blaxploitation with Blacula . Feeding off this success ,  AlP sought to 
make another blaxploitation horror hit. Sticking to the Blacula success 
formula, executives did not seek to create a second film from scratch as 
much as put a black face on a previous horror hit. To do this ,  the produc­
tion company turned to their previous release, The Incredible Two­
Headed Transplant, a 1 97 1  horror film about a mad scientist who trans­
plants the head of a serial killer onto the body of a mentally disabled 
man. While this film explored the struggle between a murderer and an 
innocent trapped in one body, producers simply racialized this conflict, 
placing a black man and a white man in a single body, and The Thing 
with Two Heads was born. 
At the helm of this project was Lee Frost, a veteran of exploitation 
cinema. From nudies to mondo shock documentaries, westerns to blax­
ploitation, he had nearly a decade of experience and more than twenty 
films under his belt before 1 972.  Throughout his genre-bending career, 
he remained interested in pushing the envelope while challenging audi­
ences, using campiness  to make bitter social messages more palatable. 
For the role of the parasitic head, AlP sought Ray Milland. The Welsh 
actor began his career under contract with Paramount in 1 934 where he 
played sophisticates ,  aristocrats, and Brits in romantic comedies .  By the 
70s he experienced a minor revival playing racist patriarchs in blax­
ploitation horror films, symbolically carrying with him a kind of elderly, 
Hollywood-approved, bigot-playing whiteness  to his performance in the 
film. For its star, AlP found quite the opposite in Rosey Grier. The 
football star enjoyed a distinguished career on the field as part of the 
L.A. Rams ' "Fearsome Foursome."  Off the field, he acted on television 
and film with a recurring role in "Daniel Boone" ( 1 964) and "The Rosey 
Grier Show" ( 1 969) . By the early 70' s ,  he had joined the ranks of a band 
of athlete-actors brandishing a bold new brand of African American ma­
chismo. With the likes of Fred Williamson, Jim Brown, and Jim Kelly, 
Grier had come to symbolize authoritative, cool, self-possessed black­
ness .  His persona both fed and was fed by the growing Black Power 
Movement that rejected "safe black" personalities like Sidney Poitier and 
Nat King Cole. Instead, he rose with a crop that embodied a "buck" 
counter-stereotype, an emerging symbol in Afrocentric discourse. In 
these ways, even before a single frame of the film begins to role, these 
different media personalities bring racial meanings to the film. 
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FILM 
In The Thing with Two Heads, Dr. Kirshner, is a brilliant surgeon 
suffering terminal cancer. The transplant expert denies his fate, spending 
years developing experiments by which he may survive . After months of 
research, he develops a process for a head transplant. First, he grafts the 
head of one gorilla onto the body of another. Second, he allows the 
gorilla to live as a two-headed animal . Third, after the transplanted head 
acclimates itself to the host body, Dr. Kirshner removes the original 
head. Successfully completing this surgery on lab animals,  he seeks to 
overcome his deadly disease by transplanting his head onto someone 
else ' s  body. Doctors from his transplant institute issue calls for test sub­
jects . In cryptic proposals ,  they only state that they seek healthy bodies 
of willing participants who should not expect to survive the procedure. 
Dr. Kirshner' s situation worsens.  Growing more and more desperate, he 
lashes out at colleagues and alienates friends , retreating into his experi­
ments and growing bigotry . He hires Dr. Fred Williams (Don Marshall) 
to take over the institute after his death, but when the surgeon shows up 
for his first day and is African American, Dr. Kirshner sends him pack­
ing, claiming the position is no longer available . 
The doctor' s  health quickly takes a turn for the worst and he loses 
consciousness .  As Kirshner clings to life, his associates intensify their 
search for a body donor, but the only one available belongs to Moss, a 
black convict on death row. Knowing the racist surgeon would find it 
revolting to have his head grafted onto a black body, the doctors consider 
passing on the option, but, without any other prospects,  they decide to 
perform the surgery. When Kirshner awakes from the successful sur­
gery , he is pleased, but once he discovers his head attached to a black 
body, he is infuriated. On the other hand, Moss donated his body think­
ing it would go to a noble cause, but when he awakes to find he was 
tricked into eventually dying for a cantankerous bigot, he is enraged. He 
escapes Kirshner' s  underground laboratory, overpowers the police, and 
takes Dr. Williams hostage. 
From then on, Moss and Kirshner drag their shared body in oppos­
ing directions.  While in control of this body, Moss evades the police in 
hopes of proving his innocence and rescinding his death sentence . To 
avoid the police, he launches into high speed car chases and shoot-outs .  
In perhaps the film' s  most hilarious digression, he even flees in a nearly 
twenty-minute motorcycle race that pits his dirt bike against dozens of 
squad cars . In typical blaxploitation fashion, the cunning black lead 
evades the racist officers . Through masterful jumps,  turns, and tricks , he 
sends the bewildered police into one crash after another, until he both 
escapes and destroys the entire fleet of police cars in the process .  
20 1 1 ]  "WE ARE JOINED TOGETHER TEMPORARILY" 1 4 1  
Once free, he tracks down his girlfriend, Lila, played by Chelsea 
Brown. She provides the two-headed monster and Dr. Williams with 
food and shelter while they plan their next steps .  As she tries to come to 
terms with the second head grafted upon her lover ' s body, Dr. Williams 
grapples with a decision of his own. Dr. Kirshner tries to persuade him 
that Moss is a convicted killer who should die. He bribes Dr. Williams, 
promising to turn the Kirshner Institute over to him if he removes Moss '  
head. Conversely, Moss  insists upon his  innocence, telling the transplant 
surgeon to remove Dr. Kirshner' s head so he can have a chance at 
freedom. 
In the end, Dr. Williams becomes convinced of Moss '  innocence 
and agrees to surgically remove Dr. Kirshner from his body. The trio 
break into a medical supply warehouse for necessary tools when 
Kirshner takes control of the body, beats Williams unconscious, and calls 
his surgeon friends to remove Moss '  head. In the middle of the surgery, 
however, Williams rushes in and stops the doctors at gunpoint, snatching 
the scalpel away, saying, "You wouldn' t  want to do that, doctor. You 'd  
be killing an innocent man." In  the end, Kirshner awakes ,  a disembodied 
head sustained by a heart-lung machine, groaning for another body as 
Moss, Lila, and Dr. Williams drive down the street, singing "Oh Happy 
Day." 
FUSION MONSTERS 
With this plot, what kind of monster does The Thing with Two 
Heads present? Scholarship on monsters has produced its own kind of 
taxonomy, lists of different types of monsters with their particular and 
defining characteristics .  The best known and most influential is that pos­
ited by Carroll in The Philosophy of Horror. In this Aristotelian catalog 
of monster types, he suggests a two-headed monster would best fit into 
the category of a fusion monster. To understand what a fusion monster 
means, one must first consider the construction of cultural knowledge. 
To form conceptual frameworks, cultures create dualisms, dividing the 
world into mutually exclusive halves .  A culture ' s  understanding oper­
ates insofar as its people are able to neatly split existence dualistically . 
According to Carroll, fusion monsters are those that combine opposing 
attributes into a single body and horrify because they violate dichotomies 
(43) .  In a society that divides nature between land animals and aquatic 
creatures ,  amphibians become fusion monsters. In another that splits the 
world between flyers and walkers, people may shriek at the sight of fla­
mingoes .  In any case, fusion monsters blur the neat lines societies use to 
both separate and see the world. 
Fusion monsters undermine dualisms in three ways .  First, fusion 
monsters violate physical difference. Fusion monsters physically com-
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bine multiple bodies into one, transgressing biological boundaries that 
supposedly separate individuals (45) .  For example, Frankenstein' s mon­
ster contains an arm from one body, a leg from another, and a head from 
a third. Such creatures horrify because they undermine a culture ' s  physi­
cal sense of selfhood. Within a culture that assumes boundary is flesh, 
that biology is who we are and clearly delineates us from others ,  fusion 
monsters horrify because they take the bodies of many and fuse them 
into the body of one . 
In addition to combining multiple physical entities into a single 
body, fusion monsters also combine multiple psychologies into one. 
Carroll claims Frankenstein ' s  creation is a fusion figure because the film 
"presents him as if he had different brains imposed upon him" (44) . 
Here, the fusion monster transgresses psychological divisions to join 
multiple psyches in one flesh. 
A third characteristic of fusion monsters is that they unite multiple 
souls .  According to Carroll, fusion figures require the "ontological cate­
gorical ingredients that go into making monsters" (48) .  For example, he 
references possession stories like The Exorcist where one body houses 
numerous souls (44) . In this film, Regan is horrific because she vomits 
sludge, contorts her body, and stabs herself, but also because she com­
promises Western beliefs in a personal soul . Does she have one soul? If 
she can be possessed, has she lost that soul? To a certain extent, fusion 
monsters horrify because they force us to face these difficult and confus­
ing questions that complicate our assumptions about ontological identity . 
CONJOINED TWIN FUSION MONSTERS 
Before considering how the fusion monster in The Thing with Two 
Heads exemplifies these characteristics, it would be valuable to explore 
him as a conjoined twin. By simply grafting the head of the doctor on 
the head of the convict, the film conjures up and exploits the deep-seated 
anxieties that conjoined twins have inspired for centuries .  To a certain 
extent, the film borrows from the intellectual history of conjoined twins 
to inherit the horror they might induce. Like the siblings joined at birth 
struggle to make sense of their shared body, Moss and Dr. Kirshner bat­
tle while they are temporarily joined together. To consider the cultural 
meanings of the monstrous "thing with two heads," we should first con­
sider the social significance often linked to its semiotic relative, con­
joined twins .  
History contains extensive discussions on the nature of conjoined 
twins as scientists, psychologists , and theologians grapple with the diffi­
culties that the mere existence of these beings pose to cultural assump­
tions, assumptions fundamental to people ' s  sense of self, individuality, 
and identity . By challenging these assumptions, conjoined twins pose a 
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cognitive threat that has horrified philosophers, doctors, and priests as 
each field in its own way has suggested they are fusion monsters.  
First, conjoined twins exemplify fusion monsters because they com­
bine multiple bodies into one. The body supposedly marks the bounda­
ries of personhood, and flesh marks the limits of who one is .  "I" ends 
with my skin, but what about conjoined twins who share flesh? Even as 
far back as ancient Greece, thinkers struggled with this issue, experi­
menting with different limit cases, considering what organ one had to 
share with a twin before they were no longer an individual . From Aris­
totle to Ambroise Pare, they claimed twins could share hips ,  livers, or 
heads and still be two individuals ,  but if they shared a heart they became 
one person (Pare 14) .  Seventeenth-century thinkers ,  however, claimed 
conjoined twins could share all matter of limbs,  spines ,  and organs, but 
could only be considered two people if they had two heads (63) .  While 
these arguments had their differences ,  they shared a fascination with the 
limits of personhood, the physical boundaries where one self ended and 
another began. 
Second, conjoined twins have horrified people because they fuse 
multiple psychologies into a single body. Most discourse on conjoined 
twins fixates on their personality differences .  For example, Chang and 
Eng, the world' s  most famous conjoined twins, were anatomically joined 
but psychologically divided. The former drank heavily and fought bit­
terly while the latter was quiet and long-suffering. Conflicts between 
these opposed personalities grew so fierce that courts imposed a peace 
bond to keep them from hurting each other. Stories like this about the 
psychological differences of conjoined twins fascinated psychologists 
because they tested the boundaries of personhood by challenging funda­
mental notions of personality (Pingree 1 04) . Two beings trapped in a 
single body, each retaining separate opinions, desires,  and motivations ,  
fundamentally struck at  the core of people' s sense of individuality . 
Third, conjoined twins have been fusion monsters for religious offi­
cials because they violate the boundaries of spiritual personhood. Con­
joined twins challenged notions of ontological individuality, forcing 
Christian leaders to consider if those who shared a body also shared a 
soul . For example, Lazarus and Joannes Baptista Colloredo were born in 
1 6 1 7  in Genoa, Italy with the latter' s  apparently inanimate torso growing 
out of the former' s  chest. Both were baptized, but this sacramental act 
did not prevent the Athenian Mercury from asking, "How will the ' Two 
brothers'  arise at the day of judgment?" (qtd. Pender 1 6 1 ) .  Ultimately, 
these twins who seemed to combine multiple souls into a single body 
posed questions theologians found unanswerable. 
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TRAGIC MULATTO FUSION MONSTERS 
While scientists, psychologists, and theologians have treated con­
joined twins like fusion monsters because they violate biological , psy­
chological ,  and ontological boundaries on a personal level, American 
literature has regarded the tragic mulatto as a fusion monster that does 
the same on a racial one. 
Since the colonial era, American legal, scientific, and sociological 
discourses claimed that blacks and whites were biologically different, 
articulating those differences most eloquently in the metaphor of 
"blood." In "Representing Miscegenation Law," Eva Saks notes Ameri­
can writers questioned or defended the supposedly biological differences 
between whites and blacks and found no better way to CatTY out such 
interrogations than with the figure of the tragic mulatto, carrier of both 
black and white blood. In his analysis of such literature, Sollors claims 
that because tragic mulattoes housed two races in a single body, their 
"conflict was ultimately believed to be biological, generated by the 'war­
ring blood' that was believed to be coursing in their veins" (224) .  This 
idea of "warring blood" appears repeatedly in American texts featuring 
mulattoes. Their white blood propels them to do one thing while their 
black blood drives them to do another, hurling biracial characters back 
and forth until their warring blood tears them apart and thrusts them to­
wards tragic ends . For example, in William Faulkner' s  Light in August, 
the mixed-race Joe Christmas ' s  schizophrenic behavior is explained in 
psycho-racial terms. A torrent of contradictory voices rage through his 
mind all because of the war between his black blood and white blood: 
"But his blood would not be quiet, let him save it. . .  the black blood 
drove him first to the negro cabin. And then the white blood drove him 
out of there, as it was the black blood which snatched up the pistol and 
the white blood which would not let him fire it" (449) .  In an American 
society that assumed whites and blacks were biologically different, the 
tragic mulatto became a fusion monster that combined bloodlines with 
tumultuous results .  
American discourses also suggested tragic mulattoes were fusion 
monsters on psychological grounds . Mulatto fiction suggested that bira­
cial characters contained two distinct minds, one black and one white . In 
Elizabeth Boatwright Coker' s 1 950 novel, Daughter of Strangers, Char­
lotte Le Jeune' s "mixed river" of blood whirls in her brain, giving her a 
"troubled, uneasy frame of mind" and making her "a stranger to herself' 
( 1 44) . In this literary climate, blacks had one consciousness and whites 
had another. Sterling Brown noted this much in perhaps one of the most 
famous quotes from the study of mulatto literature where he notes that 
American writers used warring blood to explain the mixed race psyche . 
Through their works, the mulatto is "a victim of a divided inheritance ; 
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from his white blood come his intellectual strivings, his unwillingness to 
be a slave; from his Negro blood come his baser emotional urges, his 
indolence, his savagery" ( 1 60- 1 6 1 ) .  Presumably, white blood made one 
intellectual while black blood made one emotional, and the black-white 
multiracial posed a challenge to racial thinking . Here, the mulatto is not 
just racially divided; he is also psychologically self-divided. 
Thirdly, tragic mulatto fusion monsters ontologically unite races .  
American writers have represented these problematic beings as  owners 
of a split soul. For example, in Richard Hildreth ' s 1 852  abolitionist 
novel, The White Slave, the mulatto protagonist, Archy Moore, declares 
that from his black mother he inherits the soul of a slave, but from his 
white father he inherits a "proud spirit" (7). Here, Moore ' s  conflict is 
not simply a social, familial, or personal one-it is  a struggle cast in 
spiritual light. Penelope Bullock notes that this example is one of many. 
In her seminal essay, "The Treatment of the Mulatto in American Fiction 
from 1 826- 1 902," she claims that in tales of the tragic mulatto, the spirit 
of his black mother compels him towards servitude while the spirit of his 
white father compels him towards rebellion (50-5 1 ) .  The tragic mu­
latto ' s white soul wars with its black one, paralyzing him with spiritual 
conflict. Nancy Tischler claims this struggle resembles a theological one 
where "the black blood and the white blood stage a gory civil war in the 
mind and body of the mulatto, much as the medieval writer would have 
had the Body and the Soul battling it out over possession of Everyman" 
(97) .  In this way, the tragic mulatto has resembled a fusion monster in 
an ontological sense. Like a possessed child or a conjoined twin, they 
have also been represented as housing multiple spirits in a single body. 
THE CONJOINED TWIN, TRAGIC MULATTO FUSION MONSTER IN 
THE THING WITH Two HEADS 
While discourses on conjoined twins and tragic mulattoes have both 
suggested these groups are fusion monsters on physical, psychological, 
and ontological grounds,  the monster in The Thing with Two Heads com­
bines both of these kinds of fusion monsters.  On one hand, like the con­
joined twin, the film' s "monster" violates the notion of personal identity, 
merging the bodies ,  minds, and souls of two individuals .  On the other 
hand, like the tragic mulatto, this monster disrupts the concept of racial 
identity by blending the physical, psychological, and ontological charac­
teristics of supposedly different races into a single body . 
The first way the film' s  monster blends these categories is physi­
cally , coalescing two people into a single body. The film establishes 
Moss '  body, enormous and fit, as one spatio-temporally discrete entity 
and Dr. Kirshner' s  body, crippled and ailing, as another. The narrative 
continually stresses the physical differences between these bodies .  Dr. 
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Kirshner' s weakness  dominates the film' s beginning. He uses a wheel­
chair, is carted from one place to another by a chauffeur, and is even 
unable to perform surgery at the institution that bears his name. Con­
versely, the film emphasizes Moss' strength. When he first appears 
walking to the electric chair, he is shown to tower over the guards, of­
ficers,  and warden who escort him to his death. An inmate yells for him 
to fight, make them work to kill him. This exhortation accentuates 
Moss '  physical superiority over everyone else in the film, inviting view­
ers to recognize just how hard orderlies would have to work to kill him if 
he put up a fight. Once the bodies are fused, Dr. Kirshner contrasts his 
new body with his old one. As he stretches Moss '  fingers and breathes 
through his lungs, Dr. Kirshner remarks about its strength, power, and 
vitality . In this regard, the film spends a majority of its first act contrast­
ing the weakness of Kirshner' s  body with the strength of Moss'  before 
spending the second act stressing their monstrous physical fusion. 
As the film transgresses physical differences between individuals ,  it 
establishes physical differences between black and white . In a complex 
relay between collusion and re-appropriation, the film simultaneously 
perpetuates and mocks racial stereotypes.  For example, the physical dif­
ferences between the two races housed in this body even erupt over 
something as seemingly insignificant as food. Once Moss, Kirshner, and 
Williams hide in Lila' s apartment, they consider a plan to prove Moss '  
innocence over a plate of pork chops .  Facing the fried food, Kirshner 
recoils ,  dismissing it as junk food for the black underclasses .  He further 
racializes his disdain by evoking racial stereotypes when he sneers, 
"What do you have for dessert? Watermelon?" In this context, the stom­
ach becomes a battleground and the two heads feud over which kinds of 
racialized food it will digest. Moss continues to eat the pork, declaring 
his ownership over the body: "It ' s my stomach ! "  But Kirshner rebels, 
spoiling the dinner by puffing a cigarette that forces Moss to belch 
smoke mid-bite . 
Featured on trailers, promotional posters, and publicity ads , this 
scene of the white head inhaling smoke that the black head exhales be­
comes one of the film' s  central showpieces where the thing with two 
head' s physical self-division becomes most ridiculous .  At the same time, 
however, it also becomes one of the moments that best articulate the 
film' s  "warring blood" comedy. The film spends great lengths of screen 
time to explain that Kirshner is able to successfully transplant organs 
where others fail because of his revolutionary heart-lung machines that 
filter blood among both bodies long enough to unite them. In these 
transplants, blood comes from separate individuals,  each prone to infec­
tion, waiting to reject the other. In this particular two-headed transplant, 
however, blood also comes from separate races ,  each prone to different 
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appetites,  opposed preferences, and conflicting dispositions .  The thing 
with two heads fuses the opposed characteristics of two human blood 
groups,  type AB vs. type 0, but also the stereotypically opposed charac­
teristics of two racial blood groups,  blacks who eat soul food and whites 
who do not. Like conjoined twins ,  the thing with two heads must recon­
cile physical differences between one weak body and one strong one, 
but, like the tragic mulatto, it must also supposedly reconcile racial dif­
ferences inherited through warring blood. 
The fusion monster in The Thing with Two Heads also combines 
multiple minds into a single body. On one hand, the monster fuses the 
psyches of two individuals .  Moss '  central motivation is to prove his in­
nocence, but this valid pursuit never trumps his compassion. He remains 
concerned about the wellbeing of Lila as well as Dr. Williams, not to 
mention the bystanders who flee from him in horror. During the motor­
cycle chase, he places himself in danger to keep other motorcyclists safe. 
As bigoted officers hurl racial insults at him, he still risks capture and 
death to disable squad cars without injuring any officers . After the sur­
gery that finally amputates Kirshner' s  head, even after all the bigoted 
surgeon' s  abuse and threats, Moss and Dr. Williams do not kill him. 
Conversely, Dr. Kirshner' s  psychological motivation is to dominate his 
new body. He is ruthlessly selfish, advertising for a body donor without 
fully explaining the transplant procedure, deceiving unknowing people 
into forfeiting both their bodies and their lives .  If he finds a participant, 
he plans to take control of the body and kill the donor simply so his 
"genius" may live on. Once he actually receives a participant who just 
happens to be African American, his gratefulness does not surpass his 
bigotry . Rather than appreciating his second chance at life,  he spends his 
time insulting Moss, Lila, and Dr. Williams-the very people who hold 
his life in their hands.  With the sympathetic Moss on one hand and the 
selfish Dr. Kirshner on the other, the film clearly establishes the thing 
with two heads as a fusion monster that combines two distinct psycho­
logical entities . 
At the same time, the film racializes this psychological fusion with 
stereotypes.  It establishes the black mind as sexual and the white mind 
as intellectual before fusing these opposed psychologies into one body. 
After dinner at Lila' s house where both heads have vied for physical 
control over their shared anatomy, they retire to the bedroom. As Lila 
tucks him in, Moss tries to woo her into bed. She pulls away, explaining 
that she can ' t  get over the two-headed monster he has become. Aroused 
and persisting, Moss offers to cover Kirshner' s  head with a pillowcase to 
which the white head snarls ,  "Is that all you people ever think about?" 
With this statement, the use of the essentializing phrase "you people," 
Kirshner racializes the situation, suggesting that sexual motivation is 
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something essential to the black mind. Moss seems to validate this stere­
otype when he declares to Kirshner at this moment, only after Kirshner' s 
head denies him access  to sex, "Now, you know you have to go ! "  
If, a s  this scene suggests , the film casts sex as the primary motiva­
tion of black psychology, how does it racially code white psychology? 
Interestingly, it is right after this moment, when black masculinity has 
exerted its sexual power, that Kirshner begins to take control of his new 
body . After threatening Kirshner in order to keep sexual access to Lila, 
Moss falls asleep. As Moss snores away exhausted by sexual frustration, 
Kirshner concentrates his psychological energies ,  finally making fists 
with both hands . As he exercises mental power over this physical body, 
he smiles maniacally . If this scene suggests that African Americans are 
preoccupied with sex, this moment suggests that whites are preoccupied 
with domination. Moss seeks physical intimacy with a lover he has not 
seen for years while Kirshner wishes to control the body so he can kill 
Moss .  
Like the dinner scene, this bedroom scene features prominently in 
the film' s  publicity campaign and for obvious reasons. Its overt sexual­
ity functions like a cheap selling point to the young exploitation crowd to 
which it was marketed. At the same time, the scene hints at the sexual 
complexity that the two-headed monster presents. What is physical inti­
macy between two lovers when one has a head grafted onto his shoul­
ders? To accept Moss '  invitation, would Lila be consummating her 
relationship with him alone or with Kirshner as well? Titillation and 
allusions to menage-a-trois aside, this bedroom scene is also central to 
the film because it ludicrously articulates the thing with two head' s psy­
chological self-division in racial terms .  This fusion monster inherits two 
blood types but also two different racialized psychologies ;  its black half 
pursues sexual pleasure and its white half pursues mental control. Like 
conjoined twins ,  this fusion monster must reconcile psychological differ­
ences between individuals ,  a sexual Moss and an intellectual Kirshner. 
On the other hand, like tragic mulattoes, this fusion monster must also 
reconcile supposedly psychological differences between races ,  a lascivi­
ous black and an ascetic white . 
Thirdly, the thing with two heads combines multiple souls into one 
body. Kirshner convinces Dr. Desmond (Roger Perry) to perform the 
two-headed transplant, claiming, "My genius must be prolonged. I want 
to transplant my head on a healthy body." When Kirshner pleads, "My 
genius must be allowed to continue . . . . There is no other way for me to 
live," he evokes a form of Western dualism that conflates the anatomical 
brain with the soul to suggest that his metaphysical being can survive as 
long as his head does ,  even if it is transplanted upon another body . With 
this plea, the doctor suggests that there is some aspect of identity that 
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transcends the physical, that something of him endures even after the 
body has gone. His quest to appropriate a new body is based on that 
assumption, the belief that his genius constitutes his true identity, that his 
soul will outlive the death of his anatomy. 
Like conjoined twins, the fusion monster of The Thing with Two 
Heads houses two souls in a single body, but, like tragic mulattoes,  those 
souls are also racialized. On three separate occasions,  Kirshner uses that 
signature address of racist essentialism, "you people," an insultingly re­
ductive statement that suggests there is such a thing as a black soul ex­
clusive and essential to all black people . But essentialism is not only the 
tool of oppression. In her oft-cited consideration of "strategic essential­
ism," Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak claims that oppressed groups often 
make "a strategic use of positivist essentialism in a scrupulously visible 
political interest" that actually undermines oppression (2 1 4) .  For exam­
ple, Dr. Kirshner tries to dismiss the individuality of African American 
people by clumping them into one racialized monolith, but African 
American characters insist on their unity by bonding through racial com­
monality . Upon originally escaping, when Moss first takes Dr. Williams, 
the only black member of the Kirshner Institute, hostage, he hails him 
with that signature phrase of anti-racist strategic essentialism, "soul 
brother," a unifying title that mobilizes blacks to share a spiritual connec­
tion against white supremacy.  For the bigot, the fear becomes that when 
he transplanted his head onto a black body, he may have turned his ge­
nius black. According to his own logic, he may be one of the souls to 
which he refers when saying, "You people."  
Lila exploits this fear in the dinner scene . When Kirshner gags 
from eating collard greens,  she mocks the blackening of his soul. Using 
his own racial stereotypes against him, she includes him in the ' 'y '  all" 
when she asks, "What do y ' all think about having fried possum and chit­
terlings for supper tomorrow?" She includes him in the "we" when she 
says, "And after supper, we can all sit around and sing spirituals ." As 
noted above, American literature has used the discourse of racialized 
souls to argue that a black spirit dooms one to servitude while a white 
spirit entitles another to rule. Kirshner benefits from this assumption, 
suggesting all blacks, all the "you people," share a spiritual disposition 
towards subservience, but when blacks evoke strategic essentialism-re­
fer to each other as soul brothers, call their cuisine soul food, evoke Ne­
gro spirituals ,  and claim that blacks are spiritually connected in the 
struggle against white supremacy-the doctor becomes trapped by his 
essentialist assumptions .  The discourse from which he benefited now 
ensnares him and forces him to fear that as he inhabits a black body he 
may also have a black soul. 
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While the above may show how historical discourses on conjoined 
twins and tragic mulattoes meet in The Thing with Two Heads, questions 
about the film' s significance may remain. To consider the film' s full 
import, we must consider the extent to which the most important aspect 
of fusion monsters is that they reveal something about society . Like all 
monsters , fusion ones can be read as social symbols, and they horrify 
audiences precisely because they strike at a group' s  core values .  
In  this regard, besides combining multiple biological, psychological, 
and ontological entities ,  fusion monsters combine multiple social entities. 
Such has been the case with discourses concerning conjoined twins .  
Throughout history, people have interpreted the conjoined twin as  a so­
cial symbol : two persons struggling in one physical body symbolize two 
social groups struggling in one political body. During the seventeenth 
century, Englishmen claimed Lazarus and Joannes Colloredo, the Italian 
conjoined twins, symbolized Catholic England' s  struggle with Rome 
(Pender 1 57) .  During the Civil War, Americans claimed Chang and Eng 
symbolized the struggle between Northerners and Southerners (Pingree) .  
From 1 7th century England to  1 9th century U.S . ,  the internal struggle of 
conjoined twins has symbolized the internal struggles of nations. 
Similarly, the internal struggles of fictional mulattoes were used to 
symbolize the struggle between American racial groups .  In the first 
book-length study of the tragic mulatto, Berzon notes that this literary 
figure is taken "as the embodiment of social misunderstanding, of the 
dislocation of modern life, of the search for the father, of the suffering of 
all mankind, as the conscience of mankind" (80-8 1 ) .  Many writers and 
readers of American literature have regarded the tragic mulatto in this 
archetypal way, claiming that the black blood and white blood warring in 
the mulatto' s  body symbolized the black and white races warring in the 
American national body . 
The fusion monster in The Thing with Two Heads can also be read 
as a social symbol that articulates the struggles between black and white 
social groups in the United States during the 1 970s. For years before the 
film' s  release, the Civil Rights Movement sought to integrate blacks into 
white society, securing their equality as a minority among the majority, 
but by the year of the film' s release the Black Power Movement had 
gained authority . Giving up on the hope that American society could 
ever treat blacks equally, nationalists sought to create a separate society. 
Some held a Manichean worldview, seeking to reaffirm the beauty of 
black culture by purging it of all white influence:  blacks had internalized 
racism, and if they wished to rise, they had to cleanse themselves of 
white thinking .2 The film articulates this desire to "get the man off your 
2 For an excellent discussion of the dualistic roots of the Black Power Movement see 
Cornel West ' s  "Malcolm X and Black Rage." 
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back" by literally attaching a bigoted white head, the mind spouting ra­
cist ideology, onto the back of the black body that has internalized it. 
From the beginning, Moss rebels against the white head' s domination. 
Upon waking from the surgery, he notices Kirshner attached to him, and 
when the doctor tells him "We are joined together temporarily," Moss 
grows enraged, thrashing about until doctors anesthetize him. Kirshner 
immediately regrets trying to dominate the black man, saying, "How am 
I ever going to control him . . .  he could kill me !"  Similarly, during the 
time of the film' s  release, whites began to see their control over blacks 
waning and the emergence of a Black Power Movement that threatened 
to consume them. Riots of previous years weighed heavy and fresh on 
the minds of many Americans, proof that the reconciliation offered by 
the Civil Rights Movement had given way to violent forms of black rage . 
In this way, this fusion monster, with all of its physical struggles between 
Moss and Kirshner, symbolized national struggles between blacks and 
whites. 
While the conjoined twin/tragic mulatto fusion monster in The 
Thing with Two Heads symbolizes the struggles between black and white 
social groups as monstrous,  it also symbolizes the necessity of that mon­
strosity, suggesting a kind of symbiotic relationship between white and 
black. After the initial surgery that fuses their bodies,  Moss and Kirshner 
suffer an infection. Dr. Desmond, the operating surgeon, instructs assist­
ing doctors to preserve the black head because they "need all the help 
[they] can get from him." Here, Dr. Kirshner' s genius depends upon 
Moss ' s  anatomy, and white genius relies on the black body. Conversely, 
in the film, this monster' s black body also needs the white mind. During 
the getaway scene, Moss decides to shoot Kirshner' s head, but Dr. Wil­
liams jumps in, declaring, "You kill him, you kill yourself! "  This long 
after the transplant, the black body and the white head have fused and 
their lives inextricably depend upon each other. With this image of Moss 
and Kirshner assimilating into one physical body, the film suggests the 
need for blacks and whites to assimilate into one national body. 
Despite these moments that suggest racial symbiosis, the film' s  end­
ing ultimately symbolizes the relationship between these two groups as 
an antagonistic one that ends with eventual re-segregation. Despite 
scenes that emphasize racial hybridity, separation remains the central 
motivation of the Moss/Kirshner monster. Throughout their escape, both 
heads vie for Dr. Williams ' s  assistance.  Kirshner offers him an execu­
tive position at the institute if he will cut off the black head. Kirshner 
explains that he still has much to teach the world about transplants , and if 
Williams helps him, he will help humanity. Conversely, Moss spends 
the entire film asserting that he is innocent, does not deserve execution, 
and, therefore, Kirshner has no right to his donated body. Appealing to 
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Dr. Williams ' s  morality, Moss claims that if he was guilty, he would die 
willingly, but since he killed no one, he should have a chance to clear his 
name, a chance Williams must facilitate by amputating Kirshner' s head 
so Moss can live . 
In the end, Moss wins Dr. Williams ' s  sympathy. To save the con­
vict' s life, the doctor decides to remove Kirshner' s head, but as the group 
breaks into a surgical supply warehouse to retrieve necessary medical 
instruments, Kirshner finally takes full control of Moss ' s  body and beats 
the two black men unconscious before retreating to his private labora­
tory . There, he makes preparations to amputate the black head himself, 
but just as the scalpel reaches Moss ' s  neck, Dr. Williams bursts in, 
snatches the blade away, and declares, "You wouldn' t  want to do that, 
doctor. You ' d  be killing an innocent man." The camera cuts away and 
moments later, Dr. Williams appears on the phone calling Dr. Desmond, 
telling him to hurry to Dr. Kirshner' s house. Dr. Desmond rushes into 
the room only to find Dr. Kirshner' s  disembodied head attached to a 
heart-lung, blood-filtering machine, moaning, "Get me another body, 
please ." While the film suggests that this fusion monster needs both 
black and white heads, its ending, suggests that amputation is inevitable . 
Furthermore, when the credits roll over images of Moss, Lela, and 
Dr. Williams driving away together smiling, clapping, and singing "Oh 
Happy Day," the conventions of cinematic formal closure invite the audi­
ence to celebrate the amputation of the white head from the black body. 
Given this conclusion, the conjoined twin/tragic mulatto in The Thing 
with Two Heads symbolizes the antagonism between blacks and whites 
that only seems to end with the eradication of fusion, the re-individuation 
of Moss and Kirshner, and the re-segregation of blacks and whites .  
The Thing with Two Heads flirts with the idea of racial hybridity, 
spends a majority of its length exploiting the horror of the conjoined 
twinltragic mulatto, but, in the end, the hybridity this fusion monster 
symbolizes is dismissed. Among the film' s  endless comedic gags, the 
only thing meant to be taken seriously may be the desire of the monster' s 
two halves to amputate the other, to re-individuate themselves, and, sym­
bolically, to re-segregate black and white . As Moss eventually wins sole 
ownership over his body, the film implies that African Americans can 
break free from white supremacy and amputate the oppressive whiteness 
that has been grafted upon them. As Dr. Kirshner ends up a disembodied 
head pleading for another body, the film suggests that whiteness is preda­
tory, a disembodied genius always preying on the bodies of others. In 
the end, the film suggests that black and white are essentially incompati­
ble essences.  
At the same time, The Thing with Two Heads mocks essentialist 
assumptions that blacks and whites are biologically, psychologically , and 
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ontologically different. The fact that the film was marketed as a horror 
film suggests that the blurring of the categorical distinctions between 
blacks and whites is horrific, but the fact that the film functions more like 
a comedy suggests that this transgression of racial distinctions is also 
pleasurable . Given how the film treats the conjoined twin/tragic mulatto 
with such humor, one has to wonder whether its fusion monster is a mon­
ster at all .  If, as Carroll claims, fusion monsters horrify because they 
transgress conceptual binaries and contemporary categories increasingly 
embrace hybrid attributes,  then one has to wonder if fusion monsters still 
horrify . Throughout history, conjoined twins horrified because they 
united categorically distinct biological, psychological, and ontological at­
tributes that would otherwise individuate people, but in the 2 1 st century 
where categorical distinction increasingly erodes into hybridity, are con­
joined twins still monsters? Throughout American literature, tragic mu­
lattoes horrified because they united categorically distinct physical, 
mental , and spiritual attributes that would otherwise individuate races, 
but in the 2 1 st century, are mulattoes still monstrous? 
Conjoined twins,  mulattoes,  and all kinds of fusion monsters might 
not horrify as much as times past. Carroll ' s  model of monstrosity relies 
heavily on dichotomous thinking that may have faded slightly . The 
Thing with Two Heads suggests this much because its tone does not re­
semble that of a conventional horror film. Traditionally, such films em­
ploy dark shadows, ominous music, and disturbing monsters to horrify 
audiences,  but The Thing with Two Heads features natural daylight, up­
beat music, and a "monster" that cracks jokes,  smiles, and never poses a 
real physical threat to any positive human characters .  Given these facts, 
the film employs horror less than what Brophy calls "horrality," an amal­
gamation of horror and hilarity . He claims that after decades of cliche 
conventions horror films no longer frighten audiences with suspense. In­
stead, these movies seek to disgust and titillate viewers by destroying 
bodies with "a perverse sense of humour" (276) .  Likewise, Frost' s "hor­
ror" film seems less interested in frightening audiences than using per­
verse humor to destroy the individual racial body . In the past, conjoined 
twins may have horrified because they undermined categorical distinc­
tions necessary for concepts of personal selfhood, and tragic mulattoes 
may have horrified because they undermined distinctions necessary for 
concepts of racial identity . Both the conjoined twin and tragic mulatto 
horrified because they assaulted audiences '  sense of themselves .  Given 
The Thing with Two Heads ' humorous tone, however, one must consider 
that the fusion monster pleases audiences. Given how this film utilizes 
horrality rather than horror, one must consider that audiences do not fear 
as much as invite the conjoined twin/tragic mulatto ' s  assault against their 
personal and racial selfhood. 
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With the way that it presents these challenges-exposing racial ste­
reotypes to challenge them and reveling in a transracial body-The 
Thing with Two Heads works as a unique text of tragic mulatto literature. 
Traditionally, this literary genre has confronted racial, social, and relig­
ious themes with a serious tone, using multiracial characters to make 
political arguments within the realms of realistic plausibility . This hor­
ralious film, however, offers a different way to confront these issues,  a 
tone that addresses these social issues with horror and comedy, evoking 
stereotypes of the tragic mulatto and bending the laws of reality to mock 
American assumptions about race. For these reasons, The Thing with 
Two Heads should be plucked from obscurity, the confines of the Blax­
ploitation horror niche, and the shelves of B-movie aficionados to be 
taken for what it is: a text that, like The House Behind the Cedars,  The 
Autobiography of an Ex-Colored Man, and Passing, can offer valuable 
observations about American racial discourse but, unlike those novels ,  
can use the ridiculous conventions of horror and humor to strike at the 
truth in ways serious texts cannot. 
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